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During the 1970s and 1980s, the ongoing process of deindustrialization in Britain 
began to bite into the steel industry. In 1975, the nationalized British Steel 
Corporation (BSC) employed 228,000 people; by 1986 this figure had shrunk to 
54,000.1 Output of crude steel declined from 26.5 million tonnes in 1972 to 13.7 
million tonnes nine years later.2 During the 1970s, British Steel was lampooned as 
the weakest of the lame-duck sectors, an industry mired in astronomical levels of 
debt, artificially kept afloat by huge subventions from the taxpayer, hopelessly 
uncompetitive and overstaffed. There were a number of key ‘crisis’ points during this 
period, when much national political and media focus was placed on these supposed 
shortcomings. These included the much-publicized and protracted negotiations 
between British Steel and the steel unions, December 1975–January 1976, when 
British Steel’s tactless chief executive, Bob Scholey, described as ‘just for starters’ 
press speculation that 44,000 jobs were to be axed in the industry;3 the early closure 
of the first of the so-called ‘Beswick ‘plants4 in 1977, several years earlier than 
promised; and the three-month long national steelworkers strike of January–April 
1980, the first the industry had experienced since the General Strike of 1926. 
The steelworkers’ strike was a major social and political, as well as industrial, 
event. Involving over 100,000 workers, it resulted in almost nine-million striker 
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days.5 It was, at the time, the longest national strike in the post-1945 era and the 
first major conflict between the trade-union movement and the new Thatcher 
government, elected in May 1979. Called in response to a 2% pay offer by British 
Steel at a time when inflation was 17%, pay was only the nominal issue. The dispute 
highlighted some of the deeper problems that confronted the industry and 
generated and brought into focus a number of competing discourses concerning the 
causes of, and possible solutions to, these difficulties. In keeping with the popular, 
saloon-bar narratives that blamed trade unions for British decline, the hegemonic 
view that emerged during this era was that British Steel was overstaffed, 
uncompetitive, hobbled through low productivity of labour, and in need of severe 
rationalization. It was a consensus accepted by virtually all politicians, and the 
media, and one that set the parameters for much of the public discussion on the 
strike. This discourse was contested, however, first by a group of academics, who 
were involved in the unsuccessful campaign to save Corby steelworks in 1979, and 
second by a group of trade-unionists employed in the research office of the main 
steelworkers’ union, the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC).   
During the dispute, the ISTC researchers produced a weekly newspaper, the 
Steelworkers Banner. In some respects, the Banner followed a traditional pattern of 
strike journals, in that it provided a rationale for the industrial action; supplied rank-
and-file union members with information about strike activities and the latest news 
on negotiations; and hurled humorous invective in the direction of British Steel. But 
the aims of the Banner went far further than an exposure of the shortcomings of the 
pay offer. Much of its focus was on the deeper problems facing the industry. The 
target was the consensus, constructed in the 1970s, on the causes of this decline. 
Refusing to accept the case for job cuts and plant closures made by the government 
and British Steel, the Banner constructed and disseminated an alternative 
programme for the steel industry. This not only challenged the assumptions made by 
journalists, politicians and British Steel officials alike, but moved the debate well 
beyond the limited parameters that these had established for debate. Despite the 
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steel unions never having adopted this programme as a basis for their strategy, it 
was significant because it represented both a rare challenge to managerial 
prerogatives concerning company strategy, and provided an alternative discourse on 
the industrial decline and associated conflicts that are seen to have characterized 
this period.  
 
 
The iron and steel industry in context 
 
The iron and steel industry had been crucial to Britain’s emergence as a leading 
global manufacturer, but after 1945 its deficiencies became evident. Although the 
1950s saw growth and profit for the handful of huge private companies that 
dominated the industry, structural problems caused primarily through lack of 
investment and a reliance on outdated technology lay unresolved.6 Exports were 
sluggish in comparison with rival nations.7 The renationalization of the industry in 
1967 did not resolve the problems. Not only was the new British Steel Corporation 
saddled with a huge debt caused by paying private shareholders an over-inflated 
price,8 the industry was adversely affected by the decision to keep key parts under 
private ownership. Firms producing much of the high-value alloy and stainless steel, 
re-rollers, and stockholders remained in private hands, as did those using the 
smaller, electric-arc furnaces, that used scrap to make steel. Overall, the private 
steel industry had around 18% of the British market, but was worth comparatively 
more – £600 million per annum to British Steel £1500 million. 9 An opportunity to 
build a fully-integrated steel sector had been lost.10 
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The newly nationalized industry was immediately subject to a process of 
labour rationalization – over 32,000 steelworkers lost their jobs, during 1967–1972.11 
By the end of this period, British Steel had scrapped its ‘heritage strategy’ of 
maintaining and developing existing plants in favour of the far more ambitious Ten 
Year Development Strategy, which envisaged an industry based on large plants,12 
inspired by the huge coastal plants in Japan. The thinking was that while demand for 
steel would continue to rise, this could be met with fewer steelworkers, achieved by 
closing smaller plants and concentrating much of a planned £3 billion investment 
programme at five major works – Llanwern, Port Talbot, Ravenscraig, Teesside, and 
Scunthorpe.13 The corporation believed that this would facilitate a significant rise in 
capacity, from 27 million tonnes in 1971 to 36–38 million tonnes by the early 1980s. 
But the social costs of this would be high and would result in the closure of at least 
eighteen plants and 50,000 redundancies.14  
The election of the Labour government in February 1974 resulted in a review 
of the closures and a temporary stay of execution for the threatened plants. But the 
new expansionist strategy was undermined by the worldwide recession, which had 
begun in late 1973 following the 400% increase in oil prices after the Arab –Israeli 
war. By 1975, global steel production had fallen by 8%, but for British Steel, the drop 
was higher, at almost 11%.15 As Blyton pointed out, the corporation’s difficulties 
were not solely the result of the recession but also because of the increased 
importation of steel.16  British Steel’s share of the market for crude steel had fallen 
from 91% to 82%, but it was in the market for finished-steel products that the drop 
was starkest. Here, corporation share of the British market for steel had fallen from 
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70.4% in 1970 to just 54.1% by 1975, while imported steel rose from 5.5% in 1970 to 
20.7% in 1975. 17  
The Ten Year plan had the twin objectives of increased production and less 
labour. In the new environment of global economic decline, the first goal was 
shelved, while the second was intensified. In 1975, British Steel chair, Sir Monty 
Finniston, expressed the hope that the company would have an eventual 
employment level of 50,000, concentrated at a handful of production centres.18 The 
scale of what Finniston was suggesting can be appreciated when it is considered that 
British Steel employed over 180,000 workers at this time. By 1977, the Labour 
government was buckling under the pressure and, by means of high redundancy 
payments, began to close the Beswick plants earlier than had been pledged, 
beginning with Clyde Iron Works.  
The crisis facing steelworkers worsened in 1979. After the Conservative 
election victory in May of that year, the new Secretary of State for Industry, Keith 
Joseph, made clear his intention that there would be no subsidy for British Steel’s 
losses beyond March 1980. Given that these had apparently totalled £444 million in 
1977–78 and £309 million in 1978–79,19 steelworkers saw this as a hostile act that 
presaged even more job losses. In November, Scholey announced his plan to reduce 
steel production from 21 million tonnes to 15 million tonnes. British Steel 
employment levels were to be slashed from 152,000 to just 100,000. Shortly after 
this, the derisory pay offer was made to the ISTC and National Union of 
Blastfurnacemen (NUB). It was this step which provoked the strike. On 8 December, 
after floods of telegrams from activists in the regions, the ISTC executive met and 
decided that a national strike would begin on 2 January 1980. 20  
 
 
Discourses of Decline 
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Accompanying this process of deindustrialization was the construction and 
popularization of a hegemonic narrative that there was no feasible alternative to the 
rationalization programme. In January 1973, as the Heath government had prepared 
to publicize the detail of its steel strategy, the Minister for Industry, Tom Boardman, 
commented that:  
 
Any conceivable strategy must mean a large reduction in the British Steel 
Corporation’s employment … Many existing plants have no commercial 
future and there is no way in which they could be kept alive. Modernisation, 
however much we may regret it, means fewer jobs. But without it all the jobs 
in the industry would ultimately be at risk because it could not stand up to 
competition.21 
 
During the crisis of 1975–76, following Scholey’s ‘just for starters’ threat, the 
national press weighed in with its own common sense offering:  
 
British steel is currently losing money at a rate of £400 million per year. Some 
of these losses are due to the worldwide economic recession, which … will be 
corrected by recovery. What will not go away of its own accord is 
overmanning within the steel industry. Under the leadership of Sir Monty 
Finniston and his Chief Executive, Mr Bob Scholey, the corporation has 
consistently and creditably drawn attention to the need to reduce its labour 
force and increase its productivity. It is acutely aware that its most efficient 
works produce no more than 350 tons of steel per man per year against 
Japan’s best of 750 tons. But so far its efforts to remedy the situation have 
been balked … what the BSC must not do—and what the Government must 
not let it do—is to give up its efforts to reduce its labour force to an effective 
level.22 
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Neither was this discourse limited to British Steel, the Conservative Party and the 
establishment press. By the mid-1970s, neoliberal ideas were beginning to gain an 
audience among Labour politicians. 23 This was rooted in Labour’s internalization of 
capitalist ideology more generally. For much of the post-war era, a time of 
unprecedented economic growth and a limited social-democratic consensus, 
Labour’s acceptance of this ideology had been less damaging to working-class 
interests. However, in the new scenario that was unfolding in the 1970s, one where 
capitalism was in crisis and Keynesianism undermined, it resulted in the party 
leaders accepting as inevitable the prescriptions of those who were advocating a 
very different, and much harsher, method of restoring economic stability and 
profitability. This approach was not new. Its main proponents had been active since 
the 1940s in their efforts to overturn the post-war consensus and destroy the 
economic and political power of organized labour, but, in this changing and more 
chaotic context of a global recession, their ideas were now gaining traction. In 1974, 
Friedrich Hayek won the Nobel Prize for economics; two years later, the recipient 
was Milton Friedman.24  
The year 1976 was the point when the Callaghan government would accept 
the diktat of the International Monetary Fund as a means of restoring economic 
stability and growth.25 But the damaging consequences of Labour’s acceptance of 
capitalist ideology had already become evident to steelworkers. In 1975 the 
Secretary of State for Employment and Ebbw Vale MP, Michael Foot, delivered a 
speech to his own constituents that was remarkable for the degree to which it was 
laced with this type of thinking. Rejecting the criticisms of those campaigning to 
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keep the local plant open, Foot stated there was no viable alternative to the British 
Steel plan to end steelmaking at Ebbw Vale – a decision which would eventually 
result in the loss of 1300 jobs. ‘The BSC’s case is that they can manufacture steel 
more cheaply elsewhere than they can here at Ebbw Vale. The facts on this are 
incontestable’, Foot maintained.26 In 1978, the Department of Industry produced a 
pessimistic, twelve-page White Paper, entitled The Road to Viability. Among its main 
provisions was an acceptance that steel was in permanent decline; that some 
markets had been lost forever; that productivity of labour was low; that there should 
be no more blueprints for the future of the industry; and that none of the Beswick 
plants had a future. 27 
True, Labour governments did display concern over the social consequences 
of economic restructuring. For example, in the 1960s the Wilson governments had 
attempted to offset the rapid decline in mining employment with policies that 
sought to attract investment for light industries and consumer goods in the affected 
regions. As Phillips points out, this, the ‘moral economy of deindustrialisation’, was 
accepted by miners partly because their economic security was protected, and partly 
because they were involved in the decision-making process.28 Similar objectives 
appeared in The Road to Viability, which highlighted the negative social impact of 
plant closures in a number of areas, including Ebbw Vale and Hartlepool, and 
pledged the maximum degree of regional assistance to create new jobs.29 But there 
was little time to put these commitments to the test as the party lost power soon 
afterwards in the 1979 general election. 
With the election of a Conservative government, and the appointment of 
Keith Joseph as Secretary of State for Industry, a new and very different dynamic 
entered the process. Unlike Labour ministers, Joseph was an enthusiastic advocate 
of neoliberal values and policies and appeared to care little for the social 
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consequences. As a guiding intellectual influence in Thatcher’s Conservative Party 
and founder of the influential neoliberal policy institute, the Centre for Policy 
Studies, Joseph saw economic salvation as bound up with job cuts, pay restraint, and 
a weakened trade-union movement. That this was the ideology now in the 
ascendancy within the Tory party had been seen two years earlier in the infamous 
‘Ridley Report.’ Here, the party’s Nationalised Industries Policy Group had outlined 
the steps by which state-owned industries could be subjected to marketization and 
fragmentation in order to facilitate their eventual return to the private sector. 
Resistance from the unions was expected, but among the measures suggested was 
the provoking of a strike in a ‘non-vulnerable’ industry on the basis that a ‘victory on 
ground of our choosing would discourage an attack on more vulnerable ground’.30 
The fact that steel had been identified in this report as one such non-vulnerable 
industry did not augur well for the British Steel workforce.  
Following the unions’ decision to call a national strike, the promotion of the 
view that plant closures, redundancies and pay cuts were inevitable components of 
any solution dominated public discourse. Between the three-week gap that followed 
the announcement of the strike and its proposed starting date, steelworkers came 
under heavy pressure from press, British Steel management and politicians alike. An 
early example of was an Economist article entitled ‘Bloated, Broke and Beleaguered’. 
Here it was argued that the only way British Steel could improve productivity and 
competitiveness was to cut jobs: ‘BSC’s productivity is so far below its foreign 
competitors that it needs a big rise to hold onto its share of the world markets, i.e. 
fewer jobs, not higher output.’31 Shortly after, in ‘Slimming Back to Solvency’, the 
Daily Telegraph expressed the hope that Joseph would soon ‘grasp the nettle’ of the 
‘armies of underemployed’ that were apparently hiding away in the nationalised 
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industries.32 The Times also entered the debate, arguing that such was the depth of 
the crisis in British Steel, British Steel should not have offered any pay rise at all.33 
This type of commentary was not confined to the traditional Conservative 
press. In its editorial of 18 December 1979 the Guardian argued that the steel 
industry was ‘grossly overmanned’, with productivity per worker ‘appallingly low’. It 
proposed a period of negotiation to allow the unions and British Steel to agree an 
alternative to the mass redundancies but that if this yielded no results by the end of 
January, ‘BSC should be free to go ahead, unilaterally, with its own economy 
programme’. The local press was no different. Even in those areas heavily dependent 
on steel for employment, similar arguments were being made. For example, the 
Teesside-based Evening Gazette condemned the planned strike, arguing in its 10 
December editorial that it ‘would cripple the industry’ and pointing out that ‘a steel 
corporation which is still at the bottom of the productivity league and pays its 
workers more than they earn is in no position to win [exports]’. It concluded that a 
2% pay offer was ‘a necessary starting point on the road to recovery’ and repeatedly 
attempted to make a case that the strike-call lacked support.  
Joseph affirmed the government’s position in a speech described by one 
journalist as ‘compassionless’. Here, he made clear there would be ‘no intervention, 
no state subsidies’ and ‘precious little else to soften the shock of the closures in the 
steel-making communities’.34 Joseph also reiterated his pledge not to fund British 
Steel losses after March 1980. 35 Four days later, during a speech delivered at a 
Christmas lunch for Fleet Street industrial correspondents, he repeated an argument 
that Hayek had been propagating for most of the post-war era: the trade-union 
movement was the biggest threat to the jobs of workers everywhere, Britain 
included. ‘If they do not heed the danger of pricing themselves and their mates out 
of jobs, that is what is going to happen’.36  
There was no effective opposition to any of this by the industry’s union 
leaders. Steelworkers were split into eighteen trade unions: the largest was the ISTC, 
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which had over 100,000 members, with the NUB next in importance with around 
18,000 members. There were also the general unions, including the Transport and 
General Workers’ Union (TGWU) and the National Union of General and Municipal 
Workers (NUGMW), and a National Craftsmen’s Co-Coordinating Committee (NCCC) 
comprised of the numerous crafts, such as the electricians, boilermakers, and 
construction workers. After the 1967 nationalization, all of these unions became part 
of a newly formed TUC steel committee. Each union conducted pay negotiations 
separately, with the steel committee supposedly there to help develop ‘common 
attitudes and an agreed approach to the problems and opportunities that 
nationalisation was supposed to bring’.37 However, when it came to overcoming the 
biggest problem of all—plant closures—it proved to be a ‘weak and ineffective’ 
organization38, which offered little resistance to rationalization.  
The union leaders, like their Labour Party counterparts, seemed to operate 
on the assumption that there was no real alternative to British Steel strategy. There 
were over 30,000 redundancies in the new corporation from 1967–1972, with the 
threat of tens of thousands more to come because of the new Ten Year strategy. 
However, the response of the committee, headed by the ISTC general secretary, Dai 
Davies, was not to question the rationale behind the closures, only the atmosphere 
in which they were happening. In a reference to their exclusion from the joint 
steering group set up by the government to examine British Steel’s new strategy – an 
exclusion made possible, ironically, by their own ‘ general passivity’39 – the steel 
unions’ representatives suggested a number of measures that might improve the 
situation. These included a request for earlier and further consultations over 
closures, and for government-supported surveys of the towns and areas that would 
be affected by closures, with the aim of identifying what industries might be 
attracted to provide alternative jobs. 
                                                         
37 C. Docherty, Steel and Steelworkers: The Sons of Vulcan (Heinemann: 1983), p. 84. 
38 M. Rhodes and V. Wright, ‘The European Steel Unions and the Steel Crisis, 1974–1984: A Study in 
the Demise of Traditional Trade Unionism, British Journal of Political Science 18:2 (1988), p. 177. 
39 Dudley and Richardson, Politics and Steel, p. 47. 
 12 
No critique or analysis of the Ten Year plan was ever conducted by the 
unions, notwithstanding the dreadful implications that it had for steel workers.40 The 
thinking behind the closures was never challenged, nor did the unions put an 
alternative forward. Davies laid out the unions’ position at a special conference in 
March 1973, when he stated that ‘before a plant is closed, adequate employment 
opportunities must be provided … it is not a policy of opposition to change but of 
insisting that change is phased so that as jobs are lost in steel, other jobs are created 
in new industries’. 41 Davies’s successor as ISTC general secretary, Bill Sirs, adopted a 
similar approach. In mid-1975, the union executive endorsed his statement 
accepting voluntary redundancies ‘where overmanning could be shown to exist’.42 
Shortly afterwards, both the ISTC and the TUC steel committee accepted an 
agreement stipulating that employees with less than twelve months’ service ‘would 
be made redundant selectively on a works-by-works basis’; that employees aged 
over sixty ‘will be considered for redundancy on a voluntary and selective basis’; and 
that the question of jobs which were ‘surplus to requirements’ could be agreed 
following ‘negotiations with the appropriate unions.’43 In January 1976, after a 
marathon series of negotiations with British Steel, the steel unions accepted that 
‘necessary reductions in manpower must take place’. 44 
Throughout this period, the union leaders fought a rearguard action against 
compulsory redundancies, but the acceptance in principle that job reductions were 
necessary was arguably more significant. In his evidence to the House of Commons 
Second Select Committee on Steel two years later, Sirs conceded that if the unions 
were kept informed early about closures and involved in the process, tens of 
thousands of jobs could be negotiated away without any ‘general upheaval’.45 When 
Labour began closing the Beswick plants in 1977, the unions limited their role to that 
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of negotiating high redundancy payments. In his autobiography, and elsewhere, Bill 
Sirs criticized workers for accepting redundancy payments, as opposed to fighting to 
defend jobs,46 but as Upham has pointed out, many of these plants had been 
earmarked for closure since 1973, and were being run down. No radical union 
strategy for saving them appeared to be at hand. In this scenario, it was perhaps 
understandable why many workers would feel that they had little option but to seek 
the best redundancy terms possible.47 
In 1979, a challenge to this ideological juggernaut was made by two groups of 
academics, who had been approached by campaigners in Corby where, despite being 
viable, the Corby Heavy End plant, which employed over 5000 workers, was 
threatened with closure as a consequence of the Ten Year strategy. It was expected 
that its order book would be given to Redcar, where expensive new plant, including 
the largest blastfurnace in Europe, would soon be operational. In mid-1978, a 
campaigning organization titled Retention of Steelmaking at Corby (ROSAC) was 
established, and a few months later its members made contact with a group of 
economists at Cambridge University and accountants at Warwick University. 48  
The Cambridge group produced reports that condemned the closure on 
wider economic and social grounds, while the Warwick group examined British 
Steel’s accounting figures and produced a detailed rebuttal of the strategy. This 
concluded that the corporation had overestimated the savings to be made from the 
closure of Corby; underestimated the costs of transferring Corby’s production to 
Redcar; and failed to appreciate that Corby could be made profitable and more 
competitive with an investment of £34 million over five years. In addition, it 
reviewed British Steel’s commercial practices. The Warwick report challenged British 
Steel on its own ground but the corporation management summarily dismissed it at 
a meeting in November 1979. Steelmaking at Corby ended soon after. In his detailed, 
participatory account of the Corby campaign, Maunders showed that although the 
TUC steel committee, and in particular the ISTC, wanted to keep Corby open, they 
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were unwilling to support the research and the conclusions of the Warwick advisers 
to do so. This was because the union leaders possessed no independent plans as to 
how the industry should be run and had largely accepted British Steel’s managerial 
strategy, which prioritized the five main centres of production to the detriment of all 
others, including Corby.49 
Given the nature of the crisis facing steelworkers in the late 1970s, it is 
difficult to understand why the ISTC was so unwilling to challenge the managerial 
prerogative. However, this was a long-standing feature of the organization. From its 
early days, the union had forged a close relationship with the iron masters and 
seemed to possess a ‘deeply held conviction … that they were good employers and 
conflict with them should be avoided at all costs’.50 This unwillingness to support an 
independent workers’ perspective on the organization and control of the industry 
was also evident during the planning stages of the renationalization process in the 
mid-1960s. As part of its preparations, the Wilson government had solicited the 
suggestions of various parties in the industry, including the unions, but found the 
ISTC unwilling to offer any proposals of its own. According to Ovenden, the reason 
for this was twofold: the ISTC did not believe that it should ‘engage in management’, 
and was also of the view that any restructuring of the industry must result in job 
losses, for which it would be blamed if it offered advice or suggestions.51 Reflecting 
on the subsequent failures of leadership in the 1970s and 1980s, Maunders went 
further, arguing that the union believed that British Steel had ‘basically got it right’ in 
terms of strategy but did not want to be implicated in the job losses that were a 
consequence.52 
The ISTC’s stance was of course reflective of a more widespread acceptance 
by trade unions of managerial authority and the right of managers to interpret, and 
make decisions based upon company financial data. For Phelan, this acceptance by 
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trade unions of the managerial prerogative was part of the wider post-1945 
consensus: in return for the unions accepting managerial control over questions of 
investment and the organization of production, employers and government 
recognized that unions had an important role to play in matters of wages, hours, and 
working conditions.53 For Campbell et al, this was as true of nationalized industries 
as it was private-sector companies. The boards of the state-owned industries were 
dominated by directors from the former private enterprises, civil servants, and 
retired military officers; union representatives tended to be there for no real 
purpose. Management structures were designed to eschew workers’ participation, 
let alone control.54 Hyman has explained how trade-unionists are under constant 
and intense ideological pressure to act as though capitalist relations of production 
are fundamentally ‘unalterable’. This often results in even committed trade-
unionists viewing the world ‘through a set of ideas and beliefs that reflect values 
antagonistic to their interests’. It also means that even when they ‘act collectively in 
ways incompatible with the aims and interests of those dominant in capitalist 
society’, the opposition ‘is rarely sustained by a coherent counter-ideology’.55 
Lukes’s theory of power offers similar key insights into the question of why 
trade unions routinely accept and endorse policies that protect the interests of 
elites, and are hostile to the interests of their own members. He argued that power 
could not simply be understood or measured as the outcome of conflict between 
two groups, or in the ability of ruling groups to manipulate the public agenda, 
excluding from it issues that could potentially threaten their dominance. Instead, 
Lukes posited the idea of a much deeper, more fundamental, third dimension of 
power. This was an ideological hegemony, which did not rely on force, or the 
excluding of contentious issues from the realm of politics, but  
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the shaping of perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that 
they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they 
cannot see or imagine an alternative to it, or because they see it as natural 
and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and 
beneficial. 56  
 
As applied to industrial relations generally, this ‘manipulated consensus’ is based on 
an acceptance by unions of the fundamentals of capitalism, including the primacy of 
market forces and concepts such as ‘profitability’ and ‘productivity’. As applied to 
the steel industry, this consensus would result in British Steel’s large-scale 
redundancy programme being effectively unchallenged.  
Offe and Wiesenthal’s explanation of the historic development of 
opportunism within the trade union movement—by which they meant the 
separation of economic from political struggle and the submission and assimilation 
of the working class movement to liberal-bourgeois political forms—is also relevant 
to this question.57 In order to explain this process, they proposed a model that 
traced the historic development of unions, beginning with their origins as small, 
militant organisations, based upon the dialogical logic of collective action. This is 
understood as a process of collective discussion and decision making that allows for 
the development of a class-based coherence within the organisation. However, as 
unions become larger, more bureaucratic, stronger, better established and more 
widely accepted, their power comes to be considered to lie more in their potential to 
disrupt production, as opposed to their actual involvement in such disruption. 
Strikes, militancy and pressure from the membership are now seen as posing a 
threat to the union’s survival and its chances of success, generating an internal 
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tension, which is only overcome when the union abandons the dialogicial logic of 
collective action in favour of an individualistic, monological pattern, which accepts 
the values, prerogatives and assumptions of capitalism. This is part of a structural 
transformation, which makes unions less dependent for their survival on the 
‘motivation, solidarity and willingness to act of their members’, and far more 
dependent on ‘external support and institutional recognition’ from capitalists and 
the state. 58 
Muller-Jentsch also explored some of these themes in his analysis of trade-
unionism in capitalist society. He argued that the institutionalization of collective 
bargaining and the development of welfare state capitalism in the post-1945 period 
created the conditions for the rise of what he described as ‘intermediary trade 
unionism’, where unions were pushed ‘almost inevitably into the role of a mediating 
agency between capital and labour’.59 Class antagonism meant that trade unions 
could not be completely integrated into capitalist society, but they were for the most 
part pragmatic organizations that advocated restraint among their members and 
compromise and consensus with capital. The term ‘intermediate’ referred to a broad 
category of organizations that spanned the divide between ‘yellow’ (company-
dominated) unions on the one hand and revolutionary unions on the other, and 
could be further split into three sub-groups, the most compliant of which was the 
‘co-operative’ union.  
This analysis helps to inform an understanding of the ISTC and its inability to 
challenge employers over industrial strategy. The union possessed many of the 
characteristics of Muller-Jentsch’s ‘co-operative’ category in that it incorporated its 
bargaining functioning into the requirements of the capitalist system, as represented 
by the two pillars of ‘external support’ as  Offe and Wiesenthal might have termed 
them: British Steel and the government. The union valued its involvement in the TUC 
steel committee, and throughout the 1970s was consistently keen to reach a 
consensus with British Steel over the latter’s business strategy, which, as noted, was 
simplistic and based principally on large-scale redundancies and plant closures. The 
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ISTC’s insistence that it be kept informed about these plans indicated that it was the 
process of consultation and the smooth functioning of the collective-bargaining 
machinery, rather than the rationale of the decisions taken by British Steel that it 
considered to be of the greatest importance. 
This ISTC’s acceptance of capitalist prerogatives and its fundamental inability 
to distinguish the class interests of its members from those represented by British 
Steel management found its clearest expression in the worker directors. These were 
union-approved employees, appointed to the divisional British Steel boards, with 
one representative on the national board. A concession to industrial democracy, it 
was designed to maintain positive industrial relations and provide a union voice in 
the boardroom. In practice, the worker directors often subordinated the interests of 
trade unions to those of the corporation management. As such, many were 
compliant in the corporation’s policy of ‘slash-and-burn’. As one reflected in 1976:  
 
I had the bitter experience of being in a division that decided to close down 
two plants … I found this difficult, but not insurmountable. In our case, we 
were provided with all the information necessary in order to make a decision 
on the closures. I was party to the decisions. I was challenged by the trade 
unions as to my position. I told them I supported the closures simply because 
that was the only way I saw it, in the long term. I had an obligation to the 
industry.60 (Emphasis added) 
 
The inability of the steel unions’ leaders to mount any defence of jobs and 
their deference to British Steel on matters of industrial strategy would continue 
throughout the strike and shape its outcome and aftermath. In the period prior to 
the action, Sirs went to great lengths to separate out the issues of pay and job 
losses, making it clear that there would be no industrial action over the latter. This 
was despite the TUC warning that around 200,000 related jobs could be lost because 
of the British Steel cuts.61 Sirs’s policy may have been pursued to allow him the 
possibility of agreeing a deal with the corporation on the pay claim before 2 January 
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– something that would not have been possible had the issue of the closures been 
connected to it.62 Alternatively, he may have felt the unity of the union would have 
been threatened had a strike been called on the issue of redundancies.63 One 
unfortunate upshot of the unions’ long-standing failure to formulate a national 
strategy for the defence of jobs was the continued fragmentation of the workforce. 
As a result, different regions were pitted against each other in the struggle to avoid 
closures. Whatever the reason, it did not bode well for the future of the 50,000 or so 
British Steel workers whose jobs were under threat. 
 
 
The Steelworkers’ Banner 
 
The strike began on 2 January, with the ISTC and NUB claiming 100% support for the 
action by their members. The ISTC central office in London was the strike’s national 
headquarters; day-to-day organization was the responsibility of the seven regional 
offices in Glasgow, Middlesbrough, Rotherham, Sutton Coldfield, Newport, Swansea, 
and Knutsford. With the strategy based around the prevention of the movement of 
steel, flying picketing soon became ubiquitous, co-ordinated by local committees. On 
14 January, busloads of pickets from Sheffield toured the south-coast ports,64 and 
pickets from Corby travelled to the east-coast ports of Boston and Kings Lynn.65 At 
this stage, the strike did not officially include the private-sector plants, but many 
were picketed nonetheless. Four days after its start, the TGWU joined the strike, to 
be followed by the NUGMW and craft unions. By 9 January, all unions involved in the 
steel industry were on strike, with just one exception, the middle-management Steel 
and Iron Managers Association (SIMA). 
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This was the context in which the Steelworker’s Banner made its appearance. 
Before that, the ISTC had produced Man and Metal,66 a glossy monthly that was 
sometimes informative but dull and certainly bereft of the vim and verve required of 
any national strike journal. A team of three produced the new journal: ISTC research 
staff, Martin Upham and Len Powell, and union’s press officer, Keith Dill. Upham, the 
union’s senior research officer, was the force behind and chief contributor to the 
Banner. In 1979, as a member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD) working party on steel, he had obtained access to extensive 
sources of statistics that challenged British Steel policy and the argument for 
rationalization of the industry. Crucially, Upham had also been in contact with Rob 
Bryer and Stan Brignall 67 – the two Warwick academics who had produced the 
critique of the closure of Corby. Their proposals for the future of the industry would 
also be reflected in the Banner. Upham recalled that although the ISTC leaders had 
previously accepted British Steel’s analysis of the industry, the breakdown in 
relations caused by the strike opened up space between the two, resulting in an 
opportunity to use this material and to ‘go for the jugular’ of the corporation.68  
Under Upham’s editorship, the Banner in its first edition attacked British 
Steel on three fronts – the pay claim; the corporation’s past management of the 
industry; and its current business strategy. (These would be recurring themes in the 
Banner’s fourteen-week existence.) It ridiculed British Steel’s claim that employees 
earning £80 per week would be £1.20 per week better off, noting the impact of high 
inflation, which would, it claimed, reduce the value of such a workers’ wage by 
£14.50 per week. Ruinous managerial incompetence was laid out in an article 
entitled ‘BSC’s £300 Million Loss: A Steelworkers’ Balance Sheet’. It began by noting 
how the ‘whole weight of the Corporation’s losses was being laid across the back of 
the steelworkers’, but that the real blame lay elsewhere.  It was claimed that the Ten 
Year Strategy had resulted in wasted investment, possibly as much as £188 million. 
Overtime payments were said to have cost over £80 million ‘in spite of frequent 
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claims by BSC that overmanning is widespread and in spite of trade union opposition 
to the use of unnecessary working.’ The high cost of unsubsidized British coking coal 
was also highlighted; it was claimed that unlike other European countries, the British 
government did not subsidize such coal, and that as a result, British Steel was losing 
another £135 million. The planned reduction in capacity to 15 million tonnes was 
also scrutinized. The Banner rejected the corporation’s argument that there had 
been a decline in demand across several British industrial sectors, contending in 
response that the corporation’s decision to abandon two million tonnes per year of 
export trade would only serve to strengthen its competitors at home and abroad. 
The article concluded that both British Steel and the Conservative government were 
deliberately stigmatizing steelworkers in order to deflect blame from their own 
incompetence and conceal the ongoing run-down of British industry: 
 
In order to cover up their own mistakes, evade their own responsibilities and 
avoid any public criticism, both government and BSC are trying to show that 
steelworkers alone are to blame for the crisis the industry is in. The British 
public, the media, all steelworkers and the TU movement should be made 
aware of this plot to undermine the industrial base of the UK economy; a 
ploy to shift all blame onto the shoulders of BSC’s employees, their families, 
and steelmaking communities.69 
 
In its next edition, the Banner continued the attack. One target was the right-
wing columnist, Woodrow Wyatt, who in a recent article in the Sunday Mirror had 
dismissed the strike as ‘sheer suicide’, and argued that while German workers 
produced 240 tonnes of steel per worker per annum, British output was a much 
lower 141 tonnes per worker per annum.  The supposed disparity between the 
productivity of British steelworkers and those from other countries was a defining 
feature of the dominant narrative and one that strikers were keen to challenge. 
‘Figures like those are angering steelworkers everywhere’, the Banner countered, 
‘They know that BSC and the government invent them by excluding catering, coke 
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oven, and contract labour workers from the foreign labour figures’. When this was 
factored into the comparison, the real figure was much closer. German workers 
were slightly ahead, but only by 200 tonnes to 192 tonnes. And with the European 
Commission’s figures showing that British labour costs were lower than any other 
EEC nation, this meant it was cheaper to produce steel in Britain than in Germany. 70 
The connection between the strike and British Steel managerial 
incompetence was reinforced in the third edition. Examples of mismanagement 
included the equipment for a second giant blastfurnace at Redcar, which had been 
purchased at an eye-watering cost of £110 million, and incurred interest payments 
of £11 million per year, but which had never been assembled and was now gathering 
rust in a nearby field; the construction of ‘Finniston’s Follies’ – two direct reduction 
plants at Hunterston, which had been commissioned by the former corporation 
chairman at a cost of £65 million three years earlier, but which remained 
mothballed, with interest payments of £6.5 million; and the decision to cut 
production levels at Scunthorpe Anchor to 45,000 tonnes per week. This was 
especially short sighted, as the plant had not only cost £240 million to build but was 
capable of producing around 108,000 tonnes per week of the most cost-effective 
steel in Britain. For the Banner, all of these ‘managerial blunders’ highlighted the 
need for a full public inquiry into the running of the industry: 
 
Such an inquiry will clearly show that it is not the steelworkers who are 
wasting millions of pounds of public money. The real culprits have forced a 
strike in the hope that they will evade public criticism and re-direct it onto 
the striking steelworkers…if there have to be cutbacks to avoid further losses 
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then the best place to start would be with those responsible for the current 
losses.71 
 
Edition four saw the Conservative government come under attack, with the 
front-page feature accusing Thatcher of failing to support industries vital to 
manufacturing. Drawing on figures produced by the National Coal Board, 
unfavourable comparisons were made with other European states. For example, it 
was noted that whereas the coal industry in Britain was subsidized to the tune of just 
£1 per tonne produced, some European governments were more supportive – 
Belgium (£24.10), France (£14.70) and West Germany (£11.90). Other forms of 
assistance included subsidies for freight, improved grants, and loans. For example, 
the Arbed steel company in Luxemburg was provided with government loans that 
only became repayable if the company moved into profit. Sacilor had a £60 million 
debt wiped out by the French government, and had been granted low-interest loans, 
all of which had resulted in its costs being reduced from £42 to £18 per tonne of 
steel produced.72 
The Banner also examined the Japanese steel industry. From 1970, when it 
was visited by the then British Steel chair and chief executive, respectively Lord 
Melchett and Monty Finniston, Japan became the routine comparison of choice for 
those who wished to denigrate British steel workers. Tales of how Japanese steel 
workers were twice or three times as productive as their British colleagues were 
woven into popular discourse. Shortly after the strike began, the government and 
media had again invoked the supposed super-productivity of the Japanese steel 
workers as a means of discrediting their British counterparts and reducing any 
sympathy or support they might receive. On 8 January, The Times ran an article titled 
‘BSC 141 Tonnes per man, but in Japan it is 866’. Using figures supplied by the 
National Economic Development Council (NEDC), it selected two Japanese plants and 
compared them to the British Steel national average. One of the two Japanese plants 
had a stated average of just over 400 tonnes per year, but the second plant, the Oita 
steelworks apparently had reached 866. The article, written by industrial editor, 
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Peter Hill, also outlined British Steel hopes that ‘de-manning’ would soon raise 
British productivity to 174 tonnes per year, and as much as 250 tonnes at bigger 
plants such as Ravenscraig and Teesside, a figure ‘that would be much closer to 
current output in West Germany and France’.  
The Banner’s response began by noting how, in the aftermath of a joint 
British Steel–TUC steel committee delegation to five Japanese plants in 1975, it had 
been reported that production figures were approximately 422 tonnes per worker, 
per year—around two to three times higher than British steel workers. Unconvinced, 
the article then quoted recent research conducted by Matsuzaki Tadashi, an 
academic who had published extensively on the Japanese steel industry, and whose 
findings had suggested that Japan might not be quite so far ahead. Rather than 
focusing on five plants, Tadashi examined the five major combines, sixteen plants in 
all, which constituted around 77% of total production. He found that when other 
categories of worker were included, such as clerical workers, and sub-contractors, 
the real figure was 233 tonnes of steel per worker, per annum. The Banner pointed 
out that this figure –well below that routinely quoted in the British press – would 
have been lower still if it had included head-office staff and construction workers. 
This was proof that British Steel had not seen a representative cross-section of the 
Japanese industry in 1975 and that the negative comparisons between British and 
Japanese steel workers were deliberately inaccurate:  
 
What the BSC has been attempting to do is to use comparisons between 
some of the newest and most capital-intensive steel plants in Japan with the 
whole of the BSC. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that BSC’s 
attempts to falsely portray their workers as far less productive than their 
foreign competitors is meant to draw attention away from those areas where 
the responsibility for any lack of profitability should properly be laid: BSC 
management.73 
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In the initial period, the strike was limited to British Steel plants. Sirs had 
opposed moves to include private companies and had given a commitment that they 
would not be picketed.74 He argued that some were struggling financially and might 
close if included in the strike. However, they were important suppliers, and with the 
success or failure of the strike hinging on the ability of the unions to stop the 
movement of steel to British industry, Sirs’ instructions were ignored by growing 
numbers of activists. By 5 January, the 20,000-strong Yorkshire –Humberside division 
of the union was picketing the private plants.75 Indeed, private steelworks and 
stockholders were everywhere the focus of such attention. At some plants, such as 
Darlington and Simpson in Teesside, Hadfield in Sheffield, and Sheerness on the Isle 
of Sheppey in Kent, the action was intense and involved hundreds of flying pickets. 
Finally, on 16 January at a joint ISTC–NUB executive meeting, it was decided to 
extend the strike to the private sector, with the action delayed for eleven days, at 
Sirs’ insistence. During this time, a number of large private firms took out an 
injunction against the strike, on the basis there was no trade dispute between them 
and the steel unions. Two days of high-level legal activity followed, which saw the 
injunction dismissed before being upheld on appeal by Lord Denning. A few days 
later, the Law Lords finally threw it out, reluctantly.76 By the first week of February 
the private-sector plants were part of the official dispute but later, ISTC executive 
member, Tony Cook, would reflect that the legal action, and the Denning judgment 
in particular, ‘took a lot of momentum’ out of the strike.77 
The Banner team had supported the decision to involve the private sector 
and sought to expose the weaknesses of an argument that had been repeated 
throughout the press, namely that as the private plants were not in dispute with the 
unions, they should not have been included in the strike. In a lengthy rebuttal, it was 
argued that the Conservatives had drawn the steelworkers into a political battle 
which should not be confined to the nationalized sector. The protestations of the 
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private companies were brushed aside, with reference to the considerable sums of 
money they were paying to the Conservative Party and other right-wing 
organizations. For example, GKN donated £25,000 to the Conservative Party and 
another £3000 to the blacklisting body, the Economic League.78 ‘Can these 
companies honestly believe that we consider them to be neutral in this present 
dispute? The answer is as simple as it is obvious. They ARE involved and they too 
stand to gain if the ISTC is defeated in this struggle.’ 79 
In early February a series of negotiations took place to end the strike but 
these collapsed when the ISTC and NUB walked out of a meeting after just twenty 
minutes, accusing  British Steel of misleading them over the details of a new offer. 
They claimed that the latter had indicated an offer of 9% on the basic pay, plus a 4% 
guaranteed local productivity bonus, but that when the meeting started it transpired 
the bonus was conditional on local negotiations that would inevitably include job 
losses. 80 Shortly after this, in an attempt to test the resilience of the unions’ united 
front, British Steel made an offer of 14.4% to the craft unions, made up of a 10% 
increase on the basic rate and a 4.4% local productivity bonus. Accepted by the 
negotiators, it was subsequently rejected by a majority of their members. For the 
remainder of the month there would be little progress towards a resolution.  
With attitudes hardening, the propaganda war took on an even greater 
importance. British Steel possessed far more resources than the steel unions but was 
proving to be a ponderous opponent. The Times labour correspondent, Paul 
Routledge, highlighted this when comparing the ‘aggressively propagandist’ 
Steelworkers Banner with British Steel’s mediocre effort, which, consisting of a few 
half-page newspaper advertisements, was dismissed as ‘sparse, unsure and aimed 
more at its dwindling band of allies in the media than at the men on strike’. 
Routledge was impressed that the Banner now had a print run of 40,000 copies and 
concluded that the ISTC had clearly grasped ‘the key role played in a dispute by a 
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forceful communication’.81 A government interdepartmental contingency group had 
earlier urged the corporation to make more of an effort to promote its case. 
Although promising that government ministers and officials and Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI) leaders would keep ‘doing what they can to encourage and 
help in this respect’, the group reminded British Steel that the issue of relations with 
its own workforce was a matter for the corporation itself. The main point it needed 
to make was that there was no such thing as free money and that the taxpayer 
would not shoulder the burden of any increased pay. The Cabinet agreed with much 
of this. Anxious to maintain the fiction of non-interference, it offered help but 
warned it ‘could not be seen to be taking over the negotiations’ and instructed 
British Steel to do more to get ‘the facts’ as it saw them out to the general public.82  
However, if the government was not overly happy at British Steel’s lethargic 
public relations performance, matters were about to worsen. In February, ITV’s 
World in Action team was handed a cache of internal, sensitive British Steel 
documents, which it then broadcast in a documentary titled The Steel Papers. The 
programme had an explosive impact, offering substantial evidence not only of British 
Steel’s incompetence, but, more damningly, of the central role played by the 
Conservative government in fomenting the strike itself. 
The Steel Papers was a propaganda gift for the Banner and it reproduced 
long, verbatim extracts of the programme. Clips of Keith Joseph chiding British 
steelworkers for their low productivity – ‘it takes two British steelworkers now, 
despite the most modern plant, to produce one ton of steel compared to our rivals 
in Western Europe let alone Japan’— were juxtaposed with comments by workers 
highlighting some extraordinary examples of waste at this or that plant. An example 
of this was a desulphurization unit built at one British Steel works, which then lay 
unused and was eventually torn down five years later. The programme also 
suggested that British Steel was privately aware that labour costs were low in Britain 
and that the high exchange-rate of the pound sterling was a major factor behind the 
slump in exports. It highlighted how internal corporation documents made little 
reference to low productivity but carried plenty of examples of production records 
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being broken at several plants. Bungling in the processing and dispatching of orders 
had also been identified by the corporation as a problem, and was said to be costing 
much money – around £5 per tonne. British Steel’s market projections were noted as 
consistently wrong, with a ‘steady move away from reality’ being in evidence. One 
particularly sensitive British Steel document, titled ‘A Business Proposal’, estimated 
that over £380 million was to be written off under the heading of ‘abortive 
expenditure’.83  
The Steel Papers exposed the role that Keith Joseph had played in causing the 
strike. Shortly after the Conservative victory, Joseph had requested that British Steel 
report on how it would adapt to the tighter cash limit he was planning but concluded 
that the corporation’s response – which had included further reductions in output 
and even more closures – had not gone far enough and needed revision. One 
casualty was the proposed wage deal for 1980–81. The corporation had originally 
budgeted for a 10.5% settlement in 1980, followed by 13% in 1981, but this was 
abandoned during the revision process. An unnamed British Steel personnel director 
warned that what his fellow officers had taken to describing as the ‘zero offer’ 
carried with it ‘quite serious risks of industrial action, especially if trade unions 
perceive it as reflecting upon government’s influence upon the corporation’. The 
programme also made it clear that Joseph was willing to relax his tight controls over 
British Steel spending, but only to fund redundancy schemes.84 In the aftermath of 
the programme, the government took out an injunction against World in Action, 
preventing the programme from being repeated and any further disclosure of 
papers.85 
In the period after the World in Action investigation, disgruntled corporation 
employees also provided the Banner itself with more sensitive information. This 
included a document that compared financial costs per employee across the 
industrialized world and showed these were lower in Britain than anywhere else. ‘It 
is noteworthy’, Banner remarked, ‘that the only steel producer with labour costs 
remotely near ours is Ensidesa in Spain, which country has only recently emerged 
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from 35 years of fascism’. It commented that steel cost just £31 per tonne to 
produce in Britain compared to £44 in Germany, before completing with a rhetorical 
flourish: ‘What can one say about a management which cannot succeed with a 
staggering cost advantage like this? What can one say of management that knows 
these facts and deliberately conceals them?’86  
The consequences of British Steel’s mismanagement and the need for a new 
business strategy remained a prime concern for the Steelworkers Banner. Its work 
drew upon earlier reports made by the Warwick group. An example of this was the 
article ‘Where BSC Went Wrong’, which pointed out that while its European 
competitors invested more in finishing, the corporation tended to direct investment 
towards ‘facilities for handling raw materials and the production of hot metal 
(molten Iron).’ It suggested that 66% of British Steel investment during 1974–78 was 
allocated here, compared to an average of 23% among the six founding members of 
the EEC – West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg. By 
way of contrast, British Steel devoted just 10% to steel production, compared to 28% 
among the six. The corporation’s investment in hot-rolled coil was also lower, but it 
was the finishing processes that saw the biggest difference, with British Steel’s figure 
of 16% comparing unfavourably to the European figure of 38%. The article argued 
that at each stage of the steel-production process, wastage was incurred. Scrap steel 
could be reused, but it seemed obvious that the value of the steel increased at each 
stage, meaning ‘the potential for increasing the yield and thereby cutting costs is 
much greater at the end rather than at the beginning of the steelmaking process’. It 
also pointed out how production based on continuous casting was lower in Britain 
than elsewhere. Britain had led the field in this respect in 1961, but now British Steel 
made just 16% of steel this way, whereas the figure for France was 24%; Germany, 
31%; and Italy, 43%. 87 
As the strike passed the two-month mark, it was becoming clear that it had 
not succeeded in crippling British industry. This was partly because of pre-strike 
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stockpiling but also because it had proved impossible to picket every works, business 
or stockholder connected to the industry. The action remained solid in the British 
Steel plants but it was a different story in the private sector. Workers in the private 
plants had been willing to strike in support of their British Steel colleagues, but in the 
absence of any real direction by the union leaders, and a growing sense that British 
industry was coping with the strike, their action began to crumble. At its height, the 
strike in the private sector had involved forty-three of the forty-four plants, with the 
sole exception being Sheerness. The situation had begun to change towards the end 
of February. On 24 February, workers at Hadfield in Sheffield voted to return to 
work. Mass meetings had also taken place at the East Hecla and Leeds Road plants in 
Sheffield, where ISTC members had been warned of the possibility of significant job 
losses in the event of a lengthy strike.88 On 29 February, the ISTC executive met to 
discuss the strike in the private sector; delegates from over twenty private 
companies reported that in some plants there had been a general return to work, 
but that union officials had remained on strike and as a consequence were ‘left in a 
very exposed position’. Sirs applied further pressure by pointing out how the annual 
agreement with the Independent Steel Employers Association was due to expire 
soon, and that problems in the negotiations with the Midlands Wages Board could 
not be resolved until the strike ended.89 After a lengthy discussion, the ISTC 
executive instructed its branch officials to return to work at those plants where the 
workforce had drifted back.90 
The negative impact of this directive was seen at the Darlington and Simpson 
plant. In mid-February, just seven of the ISTC’s 730 members at the plant had voted 
against the strike;91 by 3 March, this had been reversed with a ‘huge majority’ now 
voting for a return to work.92 The ISTC representative at the branch, Morris 
Hutchinson, stated that it had been the union directive that had been responsible for 
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this, as it gave members in the private works the option of returning to work without 
being accused of strikebreaking. 93 At this stage, the ISTC estimated that around 
9000 of its 20,000 members in the private sector had returned to work.94 A 
significant section of the membership continued to support the strike, but this was 
weakening.  
The Banner attempted to shore up morale. The paper claimed to have been 
given a document which revealed that the CBI, the British Iron and Steel Producers 
Association (BISPA) and British Steel management, agreed at a meeting on 22 
January that the CBI would ‘leak’ news to the press that steel users still had good 
supplies of stocks. The Banner presented this as part of a deliberate conspiracy 
designed to make it appear as though the strike was having little impact.95 It 
produced a list of forty-four companies, including branches of firms such as GKN and 
Metal Box, which, it claimed, were either closing down, working reduced hours, or 
laying off considerable numbers of workers as a result of the strike. Through the 
form of a made-up letter from a fictional plant, the Banner also tried to remind 
workers what was at stake here. The letter noted the short-term attractions of high 
redundancy payments but made clear that for those who wished to stay in a job, 
conditions were deteriorating: ‘we must work harder, accept rigid disciplines, 
surrender traditional practices, sell-out colleagues and still have the threat of future 
closures hanging over us. And for what? – A continuing reduction in living 
standards’.96 
As the strike came under more pressure, some of the constraints on the 
Banner became more evident. As an official union journal, it was not independent of 
the ISTC’s leaders and could not publish articles critical of them. As long as the 
leaders were happy to accept and use the Banner arguments against British Steel, 
these constraints were hidden. But as the ISTC’s leaders began to shift their position 
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in order to end the strike, the reality of the relationship between it and the Banner 
team became more evident. Edition ten of the newspaper showed this clearly. 
Published in early March, the front page article was, for the first time, written by Sirs 
himself.  Although presented as ‘a reasonable compromise to end the deadlock’, the 
article indicated that the ISTC was preparing to accept British Steel’s prescription for 
restructuring the industry. Among the concessions offered was union acceptance of 
the principle of locally negoitiated productivity deals; an understanding that these 
should be ‘self-financing’ so as to fund a significant portion of the national award; 
and a commitment that ‘international manning levels’ – which meant job cuts – 
should be provided within the next twelve months. Sirs spelt it out: ‘it will not be 
easy for us. It will require revolutionary changes in traditional beliefs and practices. It 
will mean surrendering many customs and habits. It will mean negotiating away 
many jobs.’ He outlined what he expected in return: a rise in the basic rate of 15%, a 
bonus scheme of 5%, a minimum wage of £65, and a shorter working week from 
1981. The outlines of an agreement were here: union acceptance of rationalization 
in return for a higher wage for those fortunate enough to keep their jobs. 
These were substantial concessions by Sirs, and, in hindsight, constituted the 
beginning of the end of the strike. Picketing remained strong, but by mid-March, the 
ISTC was calling on the government to set up a committee of inquiry as a means of 
ending the dispute. The Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) 
convened one under the chairmanship of Lord Lever.97 Meeting over the Easter 
weekend, the inquiry recommended an 11% rise on the basic rate; in return, the 
unions were to agree to a joint document on changed working practices, job 
‘flexibility’ and local productivity bargaining. The inquiry also recommended that 
British Steel pay a guaranteed additional 4.5% for three months, until the local 
productivity agreements were negotiated. On 1 April, the joint ISTC–NUB executives 
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and negotiating teams voted by a majority of 41–27 to accept the proposals. After 
thirteen weeks, the steel strike was over.  
Although the unions had gained a far higher pay increase, the local 
productivity agreements tied them into a process that made substantial job losses 
inevitable. For example, in Teesside the new multi-union committee soon negotiated 
an agreement with British Steel that included 3800 local redundancies. In south 
Wales, over 12,000 jobs were immediately lost from the two main plants. The final 
edition of the Banner was published after the end of the strike, but made no 
assessment of the details of the deal or its implications. Instead, it led with an attack 
on British Steel, describing its plan to implement 52,000 redundancies and close 
productive plants such as Consett as ‘criminal’. The Banner concluded, as it had 
begun, with a demand for a public inquiry into the running of British Steel since 
nationalization. 98 
After the strike’s end, the ISTC research team continued to argue that the 
industry was viable and had a future. Later in 1980, it published New Deal for Steel, a 
book that followed the lines of argument set out in the Banner. British Steel was 
challenged on a number of fronts, including its arguments that there had been a 
slump in demand; that the British steel industry was suffering from overcapacity; 
and that lower prices around the world were responsible for British Steel losing two-
thirds of its export market. New Deal pointed out that no other country in the EEC 
had cut its output by as much as British Steel and contended, presciently as it has 
transpired, that world steel consumption would rise throughout the 1980s as a 
whole. Quoting the OECD, it argued that although developing countries would be 
producing steel, there would still be a global shortfall of almost 100 million tonnes.  
A new strategy was advanced, which included greater subsidies for coking 
coal, rail freight, investment capital, and training costs; an aggressive commercial 
strategy, conducted by better sales strategies and staff; greater diversification into 
continuous-casting production; and more investment in the finishing end. Here, New 
Deal pointed out that whereas basic hot-metal production was worth £90 per tonne, 
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galavanized steel sold for £260 per tonne and tin plate for £451.99 It was a ‘recurring 
complaint’ that British Steel was too large and inflexible. For example, it could 
expand electric-arc production, which would provide the ‘greatest flexibility’.100 
In his preface to New Deal Sirs outlined a future ‘in which customers can have 
cheaper steel, taxpayers can be saved money, BSC can prosper and steelworkers’ 
jobs can be safeguarded’. But British Steel was never likely to take the New Deal 
strategy seriously. Neither did an ISTC leadership that had already abandoned tens 
of thousands of jobs make much of an argument that it should do so. Instead, the 
corporation, now headed by Ian MacGregor,101 embarked upon a sudden 
acceleration of the programme of plant closures and redundancies. Already 
‘politically weak’ after the strike, the steel unions were further ‘excluded from the 
policy making process’, and watched on from the sidelines as the industry was re-
structured from regional divisions into self-contained product-based ‘profit centres’, 
pending its eventual privatization.102 In his retirement, Sirs would take satisfaction 
that during MacGregor’s three-year tenure, British Steel would never actually make 
a profit,103 something of a cold comfort for the 90,000 steelworkers who would lose 
their jobs during his attempt to do so. 
 
 
Conclusion: the neoliberal moment 
 
In his essay on trade-unionism and politics, McIlroy identified the late 1970s as ‘the 
moment of neo-liberalism’; the point at which 
 
the prolonged crisis of planning, the faltering corporatist experiment, the 
periodic challenges to the state, the pressure on profits, the resilience, 
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unpredictability and economic consequences of fragmented collective 
bargaining, recurring stagflation…in the context of Britain’s decline in a 
changing world economy, made strong trade unionism appear a liability’. 104 
 
It was a moment long in preparation. Right-wing policy institutes had been 
producing such propaganda for many years,105 helping to shape the parameters of 
political discourse. Hyman has shown how, prior to the 1979 election, Conservatives 
focused on ‘trade union power’ as the most important political issue, and blamed ‘a 
minority of extremists’ for causing Britain’s economic decline. 106 
The 1980 steelworkers’ strike should be located in this context. During the 
preceding decade, a consensus had emerged that British Steel was overstaffed, 
uncompetitive, and in need of rationalization. After its election, the Conservative 
government immediately adopted a hostile stance to the steel unions, seeing the 
workforce as an archetypal example of everything that was wrong with British 
industry. If Joseph’s pledge that company losses would not be funded after March 
1980 was an open declaration of war, then his secret refusal of British Steel plans to 
pay a double-digit wage increase underlined the determination to score an early 
victory over organized labour. The principal steelworkers’ union, the ISTC, seemed 
the ideal opponent. It had no tradition of militancy. Sirs himself would become a 
leading figure in the secretive, ‘St Ermin’s’ group of right-wing trade union leaders 
set up to prevent the Bennites from gaining a decisive influence in the Labour 
Party.107 But at the same time, the ISTC remained a workers’ organization and had to 
defend the interests of its members. As such, it could not accept indefinitely savage 
cuts and low pay. It might have done so for a while under a Labour government, but 
in the face of this attack by the Conservatives, the pressure from below to respond 
eventually outweighed and overwhelmed the cautious politics of the leaders. The 
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result was a strike that would prove far more resilient than the authors of the Ridley 
Report had ever thought possible. 
McIlroy also argued that even during this period of ‘high tide’, trade unions in 
Britain wielded only a restricted, fragmented, and largely negative power over the 
market ‘which they were unable to co-ordinate and develop into positive power over 
the state’.108 This was apparent in the steelworkers’ strike. Although steelworkers 
received varying degrees of support from other sections of the trade-union 
movement, including some of the lorry drivers and dockers within the TGWU, it was 
a strike they largely fought on their own and one that failed to cripple British 
industry. Neither did the ambitions of the union leaders move beyond the pay claim. 
The ISTC was careful not to present the strike as a challenge to British Steel and the 
Thatcher government’s steel strategy. Notwithstanding the fact that their 
organizations now faced an existential crisis, leaders of the steel unions refused to 
popularize an alternative that might challenge the pro-rationalization hegemony. 109 
Sirs had stated previously that the main reason for this was union unwillingness to 
be held responsible for the job losses he felt would inevitably result from any new 
strategy for the industry. 110 Jukes has written of a third dimension of power, that of 
an ideological hegemony so strong that alternatives to it are unimaginable. Muller 
Jenstch has theorised the concept of the tame and unchallenging ‘co-operative  
trade union, which positions its bargaining role within the requirements of 
capitalism.  The negativity and the policies of the ISTC at this critical juncture in its 
history gives credence to both those theories. Certainly, the leadership of the union 
adopted a pessimistic perspective, one that displayed the extent to which it had 
accepted capitalist ideology and one that would leave steelworkers defenceless in 
the face of the ever-more aggressive closures and redundancy programme of the 
1970s and 1980s.   
It is this harsh context that makes the efforts of the Steelworkers’ Banner 
during the next year all the more remarkable. With the limited resources at its 
disposal, it tried to challenge the discourse of decline that had become hegemonic 
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throughout the 1970s. Arguments aired in the Banner were later published as the 
New Deal for Steel. Some of its prescriptions proved to be valuable. Two in particular 
stand out: first, the suggestion that more investment be weighted towards the 
finishing-end of production; and, second, a greater use of continuous casting. 111 
Whereas concast was responsible for just 17% of production in 1979, by 1990 this 
had risen to 90%. 112 There was also greater investment in value-added products, 
such as hot-rolled coil, which rose from 9% of the market in 1974 to 15% by 1988.113 
The unwillingness of union leaders to support this strategy was unsurprising. 
It was only because of the space created by the extraordinary and temporary 
circumstances of a national strike that the Banner’s arguments had been allowed 
such free reign. Steel-union leaders had accepted the rationalization process for 
many years before the strike, and it was always likely that they would do so again 
after the return to work. This was especially so, given the new, harsher context in 
which they then found themselves. The remit of incoming British Steel chair, 
MacGregor, was to return the company to profitability as soon as possible. To this 
end, he immediately cut tens of thousands of jobs. Supported by a Conservative 
government that was willing to accept mass unemployment in pursuit of its social 
and economic policies, conditions could hardly have been more favourable for him 
or more difficult for the steel unions. 
Union challenges to the managerial prerogative are rare. Capitalism operates 
on the basis that managers have full access to company financial data and use this to 
construct business strategy. Any suggestion that organized labour be part of this 
process is regarded as a breach in the demarcated roles of managers and workers, 
and a subversion of the former’s authority. The response of corporate America in the 
1940s to demands made by the automobile workers during a pay dispute that 
General Motors ‘open its books’ offers a good historical example. In this instance, a 
ferocious, and ultimately successful ideological offensive was waged by employers’ 
organizations, such as the American Management Association and the right-wing 
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Free Enterprise Campaign, against the demand. Included among the propaganda was 
a sustained reworking of the concept of profit, in order that the American public be 
‘educated’ away from the dangerous temptation to view these as sums of money 
created through unpaid labour, undeservedly pocketed by wealthy shareholders.114  
However, if such challenges were always uncommon, then Britain in the 
1980s was a place where they were likely to be even rarer still.  As the political 
economy was moved further away from collectivism, it was the concepts and 
practices of industrial democracy that were increasingly targeted and ultimately 
defeated.  Phillips has shown how a central, if often overlooked, aim of the Thatcher 
government during the 1984-85 miners strike was the defence of managerial 
prerogative and the destruction of the trade union voice ‘on the high-order strategic 
issue of pit closures’.115 Four years earlier, a group of activists in the steel unions had 
also faced ‘class struggle from above’, but had managed to respond with a serious 
challenge to managerial prerogative within that industry. Inherent within the 
arguments of the Steelworkers’ Banner was the belief that British Steel management 
was not simply incompetent but dishonest, its business model was wasteful, and its 
accounting figures manipulated to make the case for cuts. The paper called for a 
public inquiry into the management of British Steel and offered a new direction for 
the steel industry in Britain. Ultimately, the Steelworkers’ Banner did not succeed, 
but there can be little doubt that had the leadership of the steel unions, and indeed 
the trade-union and labour movement more generally, been willing to mount this 
kind of challenge to the prerogatives of neoliberal capitalism, then Britain today 
would be a different place, and the litany of social misery116 created by that system 
over three decades would not have occurred.  
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